

Message Text

SECRET

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ACTION SS-25

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S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 5 MBFR VIENNA 0040

EXDIS

DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS DEFENSE, USCINCEUR, USNMR SHAPE

FROM US REP MBFR

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: APRM, NATO
SUBJ: MBFR: BILATERAL DISCUSSION WITH SOVIET REPS OF FEB 12, 1977

BEGIN SUMMARY: US REP AND US DEP REP MET WITH SOVIET REPS
TARASOV AND SHUSTOV AT SOVIET INVITATION ON FEB 12. IN
BRIEF GENERAL DISCUSSION, SOVIET REPS SAID MOSCOW VIEW WAS
THAT WESTERN PARTICIPANTS WERE NOT YET PREPARED AT THIS TIME
TO MAKE NECESSARY COMPROMISES TO REACH AGREEMENT AND INDICATED
THAT SOVIETS SAW NO REASON TO MAKE ANY NEW MOVES OF THEIR OWN.
SOVIET REPS SAID THEY WISHED TO GIVE US REPS PREVIEW OF EASTERN
REPLIES ON COUNTING RULES FOR FEB 15 INFORMAL SESSION. THEY SAID
THAT, TAKEN TOGETHER, THE WESTERN QUESTIONS ON EASTERN DATA
AMOUNTED TO THE QUESTION, HAD THE EAST INCLUDED ALL WARSAW
PACT UNIFORMED MILITARY PERSONNEL IN THE DATA WHICH IT TABLED
ON JUNE 10, 1976. EASTERN ANSWER ON FEB 15 WOULD BE YES, THEY
HAD INCLUDED ALL PERSONNEL IN ALL CATEGORIES.

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2. US REPS ASKED SOVIETS WHETHER THIS MEANT THAT THE EAST HAD
INCLUDED ALL ACTIVE DUTY MILITARY PERSONNEL EXCEPT THE NAVY IN
THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS. SOVIET REPS SAID YES, THEY HAD INCLUDED
ALL SUCH PERSONNEL. US REPS EXPRESSED STRONG SKEPTICISM AS
TO ACCURACY OF THIS STATEMENT. US REPS IN SERIES OF QUESTIONS
ASKED SOVIET REPS WHY, IF WHAT THEY CLAIMED WAS ACTUALLY THE
CASE, EASTERN REPS HAD IN VARIOUS WAYS ACTED FOR THE PAST 3

YEARS AS THOUGH THERE WERE A LARGE SUPERIORITY IN MILITARY
MANPOWER IN FAVOR OF THE EAST, AND WHY THEY HAD NOT AGREED

TO THE PRINCIPLE OF PARITY IN MANPOWER AND HAD NOT VIGOROUSLY
CONTESTED WESTERN FIGURES FOR WARSAW PACT FORCES FROM THE OUTSET
OF THE TALKS WHEN THESE FIGURES HAD BEEN TABLED. TARASOV'S
MAIN RESPONSE, A WEAK ONE, WAS THAT FOR THE SOVIETS, THE QUESTION
OF EQUAL PERCENTAGE REDUCTIONS BY EACH DIRECT PARTICIPANT RATHER
THAN THE OVERALL AMOUNT REDUCED BY EACH SIDE HAD BEEN THE MOST
IMPORTANT ISSUE. BECAUSE OF INTEREST OF WASHINGTON AGENCIES IN
THE DATA DISCUSSION TOPIC, THIS MESSAGE IS BEING REPORTED BY
TELEGRAM. END SUMMARY.

3. TARASOV LED OFF BY ASKING US REP WHETHER HE HAD NEWS FROM
THE NEW U.S. ADMINISTRATION ON THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS. US REP
SAID THAT, DURING THE RECESS, HE HAD MET WITH SENIOR PERSONNEL
OF THE NEW ADMINISTRATION CONCERNED WITH THE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS,
PARTICULARLY SECRETARY VANCE. SOVIET REPS WOULD HAVE NOTED
SECRETARY VANCE'S STATEMENT THAT THE LATTER ATTACHED GREAT
IMPORTANCE TO THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS AND WOULD LIKE TO SEE THEM
GET OUT OF THE DOLDRUMS. AS TARASOV HAD REQUESTED AT THE END
OF THE LAST SESSION, US REP HAD REPORTED TARASOV'S EXPRESSION
OF STRONG INTEREST OF SOVIET LEADERS IN SEEKING AGREEMENT AND
IN TRYING TO FIND PRACTICAL STEPS TO MOVE THE NEGOTIATIONS AHEAD.
THE US REP HAD AT THE SAME TIME REPORTED THE VIEW OF THE US
DELEGATION AND OF ALL OTHER ALLIED DELEGATIONS THAT THE EAST
HAD NOT MADE A MOVE COMMENSURATE TO THE WEST'S BROADENING OF ITS
PROPOSED REDUCTIONS AND LIMITATIONS IN ITS DECEMBER 1975
PROPOSALS AND THAT, ACCORDINGLY, IT WAS UP TO THE EAST TO MAKE
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A MOVE. US REP SAID THIS WAS THE VIEW OF THE PRESENT
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT.

4. TARASOV SAID THE EASTERN FEB 1976 MOVE HAD TAKEN INTO
ACCOUNT THE WESTERN DEC 1975 PROPOSALS AND HAD MATCHED THEM
WITH EQUIVALENT SOVIET NUCLEAR REDUCTIONS. THIS HAD BEEN THE
MOST RECENT MOVE IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. HENCE, IT WAS UP TO THE
WEST TO MOVE. US REP SAID THE EASTERN FEB 1976 PROPOSAL HAD
NOT MADE ANY CHANGE FROM EARLIER EASTERN PROPOSALS ON
REDUCTIONS AND LIMITATIONS. THE DEC 1975 WESTERN PROPOSALS
HAD DONE SO IN THE WESTERN PROGRAM. THIS WAS WHY THE U.S.
CONTINUED TO CONSIDER IT WAS UP TO THE SOVIETS TO MAKE A
SERIOUS MOVE TO BREAK THE DEADLOCK IN THE TALKS.

5. US DEPREP SAID THAT, IN ADDITION TO THIS SET OF FACTS, THE
SOVIETS MUST HAVE CLEARLY REALIZED FROM THEIR EXPERIENCE IN THE
VIENNA TALKS AND THEIR OTHER OBSERVATIONS OF THE EUROPEAN SCENE
THAT THERE WERE CONSIDERABLE APPREHENSIONS IN THE WEST ABOUT THE
MOTIVES AND INTENTIONS OF THE SOVIET UNION. THESE APPREHENSIONS

HAD INTENSIFIED IN RECENT MONTHS. REGARDLESS OF WHETHER THEY WERE JUSTIFIED, THEY WERE A POLITICAL FACT. HENCE, IF THERE WAS EVER TO BE AN AGREEMENT, THE SOVIETS WOULD HAVE TO TAKE THE EXISTENCE OF THESE APPREHENSIONS INTO ACCOUNT AND TAKE THE INITIATIVE TO MAKE MOVES WHICH WOULD CREATE CONFIDENCE. BUT THUSFAR, INSTEAD OF THAT, THEY HAD FROM THE OUTSET TAKEN AND MAINTAINED A MAXIMALIST POSITION WHICH HAD HAD THE EFFECT OF CONFIRMING THESE APPREHENSIONS.

6. SHUSTOV SAID HE WISHED TO STATE THE VIEWPOINT OF MOSCOW DECISION-MAKERS ON THE PRESENT STATUS OF THE VIENNA TALKS. IT WAS QUITE SIMPLY THAT, AT THE PRESENT TIME, THE WESTERN PARTICIPANTS WERE NOT PREPARED TO MAKE THE COMPROMISES WHICH WOULD BE NECESSARY TO REACH AGREEMENT. US DEPREP SAID WESTERN MOVES COULD NOT BE EXPECTED UNTIL THE EAST HAD GIVEN AN ADEQUATE REPLY TO THE WESTERN DEC 1975 PROPOSALS AND HAD TAKEN STEPS TO INCREASE WESTERN CONFIDENCE. ONCE THIS WAS DONE,
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THEN THE TALKS MIGHT START TO MOVE.

NOTE: NOT PASSED DEFENSE, USCINCEUR, OR USNMR SHAPE.

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ACTION SS-25

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USMISSION NATO

S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 5 MBFR VIENNA 0040

EXDIS

DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS DEFENSE, USINCEUR, USNMR SHAPE

FROM US REP MBFR

7. SHUSTOV SAID SOVIET REPS WISHED TO GIVE US REPS A PREVIEW OF THE RESPONSE THE EAST WOULD BE MAKING IN THE FEB 15 INFORMAL TO THE QUESTIONS WESTERN REPS HAD POSED ABOUT EASTERN DATA. THE WEST HAD POSED FIVE QUESTIONS. TAKEN TOGETHER, THESE QUESTIONS AMOUNTED TO THE MAIN QUESTION OF WHETHER THE EAST HAD COUNTED IN ITS DATA ALL WARSAW PACT MILITARY PERSONNEL IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS. THE ANSWER EASTERN REPS WOULD GIVE TO THIS QUESTION ON FEB 15 WAS YES, THE EAST HAD INCLUDED ALL UNIFORMED WARSAW PACT MILITARY PERSONNEL IN ALL CATEGORIES IN ITS DATA.

8. US REPS ASKED SOVIET REPS WHETHER THEY HAD INCLUDED IN THEIR DATA ALL WARSAW PACT MILITARY PERSONNEL IN COMBAT, COMBAT SUPPORT AND COMBAT SERVICE FORCES AS WELL AS ALL THE CATEGORIES AND SUB-CATEGORIES THE EAST HAD LISTED IN THE PAST AS THOSE IN WHICH THE WARSAW PACT USED MILITARY PERSONNEL TO PERFORM FUNCTIONS PERFORMED BY CIVILIANS IN THE WEST. SOVIET REPS SAID THEY HAD INCLUDED ALL PERSONNEL IN ALL OF THESE CATEGORIES IN THEIR FIGURES.

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9. US REPS NOTED THAT SHUSTOV HAD USED THE TERM "UNIFORMED" IN HIS STATEMENT. WERE THERE ANY WARSAW PACT PERSONNEL IN THE AREA NOT IN UNIFORM? SOVIET REPS SAID NO, THERE WERE NO WARSAW PACT MILITARY PERSONNEL IN THE AREA WHICH WERE NOT UNIFORMED. THE WARSAW PACT HAD INCLUDED ALL MILITARY PERSONNEL IN THE AREA IN ITS FIGURES AND HAD EXCLUDED ALL CIVILIANS, RESERVISTS AND PERSONNEL OF OTHER UNIFORMED ORGANIZATIONS EQUIPPED WITH WEAPONS.

10. US REPS ASKED SOVIET REPS WHETHER THEY HAD INCLUDED ALL ACTIVE DUTY WARSAW PACT MILITARY PERSONNEL, THOSE WHO WERE ON FULL-TIME MILITARY SERVICE AND HAD MILITARY SERVICE AS THEIR ONLY OCCUPATION AND WERE SUBJECT TO MILITARY ORDERS AND DISCIPLINE. SOVIET REPS SAID THEY HAD INCLUDED ALL SUCH PERSONNEL AND HAD IN EFFECT ACCEPTED THE WESTERN DEFINITION ON INCLUSIONS AND EXCLUSIONS AS THE BASIS OF THEIR FIGURES. US REPS EXPRESSED STRONG SKEPTICISM ABOUT THE ACCURACY OF THESE SOVIET STATEMENTS.

11. US REP ASKED SHUSTOV WHETHER SHUSTOV HAD KNOWN THE PRESENT EASTERN DATA FROM THE OUTSET OF THE VIENNA TALKS IN 1973. SHUSTOV REPLIED YES, HE HAD KNOWN THE FIGURES. US REPS ASKED SOVIET REPS, IN THIS CASE, IF THE SOVIET REPS HAD ACTUALLY FROM THE OUTSET CONSIDERED THAT THERE WAS ROUGH PARITY IN MILITARY MANPOWER IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS, WHY HAD THEY ARGUED SO PERSISTENTLY AGAINST THE COMMON CEILING AT REDUCED LEVELS AND PARITY IN MILITARY MANPOWER AS THE OBJECTIVE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS?

IF SOVIETS HAD BELIEVED THERE WAS NEAR PARITY IN MILITARY
MANPOWER IN THE AREA, THEN IT WOULD NOT GREATLY MATTER IN
TERMS OF TOTAL REDUCTIONS WHETHER ONE APPLIED THE WESTERN PRINCIPLE
THAT BOTH SIDES SHOULD REDUCE TO A COMMON CEILING OR THE EASTERN
PRINCIPLE THAT BOTH SIDES SHOULD TAKE EQUAL PERCENTAGE
REDUCTIONS. WHY, UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, HAD EASTERN
REPRESENTATIVES NOT AGREED TO PARITY IN MILITARY MANPOWER EARLY
IN THE NEGOTIATIONS INSTEAD OF VIGOROUSLY OPPOSING IT FOR YEARS?
IF THESE WERE THE FACTS, AS THE SOVIETS SAW THEM, WHY HAD THEY
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NOT SAID SO AND SHAPED THEIR POSITION ACCORDINGLY INSTEAD OF
WASTING EVERYONE'S TIME FOR THREE YEARS? THIS BEHAVIOR DID NOT
DEMONSTRATE MUCH INTEREST IN REACHING AGREEMENT.

12. TARASOV REPLIED THAT IT HAD BEEN A QUESTION OF PRINCIPLE
FOR THE SOVIETS. THE EAST BELIEVED THAT EACH INDIVIDUAL
PARTICIPANT SHOULD MAKE REDUCTIONS BY AN EQUAL PERCENTAGE. THIS
WAS THE BASIC ISSUE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS FOR THEM. IT WAS NOT
ALL THE SAME TO THEM THAT THE OUTCOME MIGHT BE ABOUT THE SAME
IF TWO DIFFERENT METHODS WERE USED. THE METHOD HAD INTRINSIC
IMPORTANCE. US REPS WERE TOO AMERICAN AND PRAGMATIC WITH THEIR
EMPHASIS ON THE OUTCOME. THE WEST HAD STEADFASTLY REFUSED TO
INDICATE HOW MANY REDUCTIONS EACH DIRECT PARTICIPANT WOULD
TAKE. BESIDES THERE WERE MANY OTHER IMPORTANT CONSIDERATIONS
SUCH AS THE REDUCTION OF ARMAMENTS WHICH HAD NOTHING TO
DO WITH THE MANPOWER REDUCTIONS.

13. US REPS SAID THIS STATEMENT WAS UNCONVINCING. THE SIZE OF
MANPOWER REDUCTIONS ON EACH SIDE WAS THE MAIN ISSUE IN THE
VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS. ONCE THIS WAS SETTLED, OTHER ISSUES WOULD
BE FAR EASIER TO RESOLVE. TARASOV SAID EASTERN LEADERS, INCLUDING
BREZHNEV, HAD REPEATEDLY STATED THAT THERE WAS APPROXIMATE
PARITY IN THE AREA ALTHOUGH THE TOTAL FORCES ON EACH SIDE HAD
A DIFFERENT PROFILE. HE SAID THIS STATEMENT SHOWED THAT THE
EAST HAD LONG BEEN ON RECORD THAT THERE WAS APPROXIMATE PARITY
IN MANPOWER IN THE AREA.

NOTE: NOT PASSED ABOVE ADDRESSEES.

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ACTION SS-25

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EXDIS

DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS DEFENSE, USCINCEUR, USNMR SHAPE

FROM US REP MBFR

14. US REP SAID THE BREZHNEV STATEMENT HAD BEEN IN TERMS OF ARMED FORCES, NOT OF MILITARY MANPOWER. THROUGHOUT THE ENTIRE NEGOTIATIONS, NO EASTERN REP HAD AT ANY TIME MADE AN EXPLICIT STATEMENT IN ANY PLENARY OR INFORMAL SESSION OF THE NEGOTIATIONS THAT THERE WAS PARITY OF MILITARY MANPOWER IN THE AREA. TARASOV SAID THAT, DURING THE TALKS, EASTERN REPS HAD REPEATEDLY REJECTED WESTERN DEMANDS FOR ASYMMETRICAL REDUCTIONS AND HAD STATED THAT THE WESTERN CONCEPT OF DISPARITIES WAS AN ARTIFICIAL ONE.

15. US REPS SAID WESTERN REPS HAD SEVERAL TIMES POINTED OUT THAT THEIR BASIC PROPOSAL WAS THAT EACH SIDE SHOULD REDUCE TO THE SAME LEVEL OF MILITARY MANPOWER ON THE BASIS OF THE ACTUAL FACTS. WHY HAD THE EAST REFUSED TO AGREE TO THIS CONCEPT IF MANPOWER WAS NEAR PARITY AS SOVIET REPS CLAIMED? TARASOV AGAIN SAID IT WAS A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE FOR THE EAST. THE CENTRAL ISSUE WAS NOT THE TOTAL REDUCTION OF EACH SIDE BUT THAT EACH NATIONAL COMPONENT WOULD REDUCE BY AN EQUAL PERCENTAGE. US REPS
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SAID SOVIET REPS WERE NOW RE-EMPHASIZING NATIONAL CEILINGS, A POSITION WHICH THEY KNEW WOULD THOROUGHLY BLOCK AGREEMENT. TARASOV MADE NO REPLY.

16. US REPS ASKED WHY, IF SOVIET DELEGATION HAD KNOWN PRESENTLY CLAIMED EASTERN FIGURES FROM THE OUTSET OF THE NEGOTIATIONS, SOVIET REPS HAD NOT CHALLENGED THE WESTERN TOTALS FOR EASTERN FORCES WHEN THEY WERE TABLED. INSTEAD, THEY HAD CHALLENGED WESTERN TOTALS FOR WESTERN FORCES, CLAIMING THAT THESE WERE TOO LOW BY AN AMOUNT EQUAL TO THE STRENGTH OF FRENCH FORCES

IN THE AREA, BUT NOT REPEAT NOT CHALLENGING WESTERN FIGURES ON WARSAW PACT FORCES. TARASOV SAID IT HAD BEEN A QUESTION OF PRINCIPLE FOR THE EAST TO AGREE ON REDUCTION METHODS BEFORE DATA WAS DISCUSSED. THE EAST HAD ONLY RELUCTANTLY AGREED TO DATA DISCUSSION AFTER SOME TIME HAD PASSED IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. TARASOV SAID THERE WERE CLEAR FAULTS IN THE WESTERN COUNTING RULES. THE WEST HAD PLACED GROUND-BASED AIR DEFENSE IN THE WEST IN THE AIR FORCES AND CALCULATED THEM IN THE GROUND FORCES FOR THE WARSAW PACT FORCES.

17. US REP SAID THE WEST HAD AGREED THAT RESOLUTION OF THESE INCONSISTENCIES SHOULD BE DISCUSSED WHEN RELEVANT DATA WAS AVAILABLE. HOWEVER, THE QUESTION OF DIVIDING THE TWO COMPONENTS BETWEEN GROUND AND AIR WAS A SUBORDINATE ONE. THE ISSUE NOW WAS THE SIZE OF THE TOTAL FORCES. TARASOV CLAIMED EASTERN REPS HAD BEEN DISAGREEABLY SURPRISED WHEN THE WEST HAD TABLED UPDATED DATA ON DEC 16. ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS THEY HAD BEEN TOLD IN INFORMAL DISCUSSIONS BY SOME WESTERN PARTICIPANTS THAT THE EAST SHOULD PUT DOWN ITS FIGURES AND THE WEST WOULD FIND SOME WAY TO RECONCILE ITS ORIGINAL FIGURES WITH THOSE TABLED BY THE EAST. INSTEAD, WHEN THE NEW FIGURES WERE TABLED, THE WEST HAD ADMITTED ITS OWN FORCES HAD INCREASED BUT HAD CLAIMED ITS ESTIMATES OF EASTERN FORCES HAD INCREASED STILL MORE. THIS HAD OBVIOUSLY BEEN A POLITICAL DECISION INFLUENCED BY WESTERN CLAIMS OF EASTERN MILITARY BUILD-UP. US REP SAID THERE WAS NO POLITICAL INFLUENCE ON WESTERN FIGURES. WESTERN REPS HAD POINTED OUT OVER TWO YEARS
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AGO THAT THERE HAD BEEN AN INCREASE IN WESTERN FIGURES FOR BOTH NATO FORCES AND WARSAW PACT FORCES BASED ON IMPROVED COMPUTATION.

18. TARASOV SAID THAT THE EAST HAD NOT INCREASED ITS MANPOWER IN THE AREA SINCE 1973. BUT THE WESTERN PRESS SHOWED THERE HAD BEEN ACTUAL INCREASES IN WESTERN MANPOWER DURING THE NEGOTIATIONS. US REP SAID THIS WAS INCORRECT.

19. US REPS ASKED SOVIET REPS WHY, IF SOVIET DATA PURPORTED TO SHOW PARITY, THE EAST HAD SPENT SEVERAL MONTHS ARGUING THAT IN THE WARSAW PACT FORCES, MILITARY PERSONNEL PERFORMED FUNCTIONS ALLEGEDLY PERFORMED BY CIVILIANS IN THE WEST AND THAT THESE WARSAW PACT MILITARY PERSONNEL SHOULD BE EXCLUDED FROM THE COUNT. WHAT WOULD HAVE BEEN THE EFFECT IF THESE WARSAW PACT MILITARY PERSONNEL HAD BEEN DELETED FROM THE COUNT? SHUSTOV SAID THAT, IN THAT CASE, THE WEST WOULD HAVE HAD NUMERICAL SUPERIORITY OVER THE EAST IN THE AREA. BUT THE EAST HAD DROPPED THIS VIEWPOINT EVEN THOUGH IT WOULD HAVE BEEN JUSTIFIED TO ADHERE TO IT.

20. US REPS SAID THAT, IF SOVIET REPS CLAIMED THAT THERE WAS NEAR PARITY IN MILITARY MANPOWER IN THE AREA, HOW COULD THEY

THEN SUSTAIN THE CLAIM THAT THERE WAS APPROXIMATE PARITY IN
OVERALL MILITARY FORCES IN THE AREA IN A SITUATION WHERE THE
EAST HAD NUMERICAL SUPERIORITY IN MOST ALL MAJOR ARMAMENTS?
US REPS POINTED OUT THAT IT WAS AN UNDENIABLE FACT THAT WARSAW
PACT HAD NUMERICAL SUPERIORITY IN TANKS, AIRCRAFT AND MOST
OTHER MAJOR ARMAMENTS. TARASOV SAID IT HAD NOT BEEN DEMONSTRATED
THAT THE EAST HAD SUPERIORITY IN THESE MAJOR ARMAMENTS.

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ACTION SS-25

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S E C R E T SECTION 4 OF 5 MBFR VIENNA 0040

EXDIS

DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS DEFENSE, USCINCEUR, USNMR SHAPE

FROM US REP MBFR

21. TARASOV SAID IT WAS UP TO THE WEST TO PROVE THAT ITS
ESTIMATES OF WARSAW PACT FORCES WERE CORRECT. THE WEST WAS
RAISING THE CHARGE THAT EASTERN FIGURES WERE INCORRECT; HENCE,
THE BURDEN OF PROOF WAS ON THE WEST. US REP SAID THE CONTRARY
WAS THE CASE -- IT WAS UP TO THE EAST TO PROVE THAT ITS OWN
FIGURES FOR ITS FORCES WERE CORRECT. EACH SIDE SHOULD PROVIDE
EVIDENCE ABOUT ITS OWN FORCES.

22. SHUSTOV SAID THE EAST WAS READY TO PROVIDE EVIDENCE ABOUT
ITS FORCES. IT WAS ALSO READY TO TABLE NATIONAL TOTALS. TARASOV
SAID THE WEST HAD PROBABLY USED TABLE OF ORGANIZATION STRENGTHS
IN MAKING ITS ESTIMATIONS OF EASTERN FORCES. HOW COULD THE WEST
KNOW WHAT ACTUAL STRENGTHS INDIVIDUAL WARSAW TREATY UNITS HAD?
US REP SAID WESTERN COUNTRIES HAD GOOD INFORMATION ON WARSAW

TREATY FORCES.

23. TARASOV SAID THERE WERE, AFTER ALL, OTHER TOPICS IN THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS. HE HAD EARLIER RAISED WITH US REP THE QUESTION

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OF THE INEQUITY OF PUTTING A NATIONAL CEILING ON SOVIET AND US FORCES ONLY, WHEN, ACCORDING TO THE WESTERN PROGRAM, THERE WOULD BE NO INDIVIDUAL CEILINGS ON ANY OF THE OTHER FORCES IN THE AREA. US REP SAID THIS WAS JUSTIFIED BECAUSE U.S. AND SOVIET UNION WOULD BE WITHDRAWING ONLY A PORTION OF THEIR TROOPS DEPLOYED IN THE AREA, WHEREAS SUBSTANTIALLY ALL OF THE FORCES OF COUNTRIES LOCATED IN THE AREA WOULD BE COVERED BY A COLLECTIVE CEILING. SHUSTOV SAID THE COLLECTIVE CEILING WOULD PERMIT SOME COUNTRIES TO GO UP. US REP SAID THIS WOULD BE POSSIBLE ONLY IF OTHERS REDUCED.

24. TARASOV ASKED HOW US REPS ENVISAGED FURTHER CONDUCT OF INFORMAL SESSIONS. TARASOV COMMENTED THAT HE HAD ENOUGH OF TALKING POINTS FROM BOTH SIDES MERELY EXPRESSING THE ABSTRACT VIEWS OF EACH SIDE. US REP SAID, IN VIEW OF THE PENDING WARSAW TREATY RESPONSE ON EASTERN DATA, THERE OBVIOUSLY WOULD BE PLENTY TO DISCUSS IN THE DATA FIELD; THEREFORE, IT WOULD BE MOST PRACTICAL IF EACH INFORMAL SESSION COULD HANDLE BOTH GENERAL TOPICS AND DATA ISSUES. TARASOV AGREED.

25. BEGIN COMMENT: SOVIET REPS TOOK A FAIRLY TOUGH STANCE ON GENERAL ISSUES, BUT THIS IS THEIR CUSTOM AT THE BEGINNING OF A ROUND AND WE WILL HAVE TO WAIT FOR SEVERAL WEEKS OF THIS ROUND BEFORE WE CAN MAKE A FOUNDED EVALUATION OF THEIR OVERALL POSTURE. WE WILL OBTAIN A BETTER PICTURE OF EASTERN COUNTING RULES FROM THE NEXT SEVERAL INFORMAL SESSIONS, AND FINAL JUDGMENT AS TO SOVIET STRATEGY AND MOTIVATIONS AND CONSIDERATION OF POSSIBLE NEXT STEPS SHOULD BE SUSPENDED UNTIL THESE SESSIONS HAVE TAKEN PLACE.

26. WE WERE STRUCK BY THE WEAK AND UNCONVINCING JUSTIFICATIONS TARASOV AND SHUSTOV PRESENTED TO OUR QUESTIONS, PARTICULARLY THE QUESTIONS OF WHY THE SOVIETS HAD OPPOSED PARITY IN MANPOWER IF THEY BELIEVED FROM THE OUTSET THAT THERE WAS PARITY, WHY THE EAST HAD NOT CHALLENGED WESTERN ESTIMATES OF WARSAW PACT FORCES MORE DIRECTLY, AND THE SOVIET ATTEMPT TO CLAIM THAT THEY

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HAD LONG BEEN EXPLICITLY CLAIMING THAT THERE WAS PARITY IN MILITARY MANPOWER IN THE AREA.

27. TARASOV'S RATIONAL THAT AGREEMENT ON THE METHOD OF REDUCTION INCLUDING NATIONAL COMMITMENTS AND THE TOTAL OF MANPOWER TO BE REDUCED BY EACH COUNTRY WAS MORE IMPORTANT THAN THE TOTAL NUMBER OF MANPOWER TO BE TAKEN BY EACH SIDE DOES NOT CORRESPOND WITH THE ACTUAL POINTS OF EMPHASIS IN THE POSITIONS OF WARSAW PACT PARTICIPANTS SINCE THE OUTSET OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. MOREOVER, THE RECENT SOVIET EMPHASIS ON THE EFFORT TO GET RID OF SO-CALLED NATIONAL CEILINGS ON SOVIET AND US FORCES ONLY, REPEATED IN THIS DISCUSSION AS THE ONLY SPECIFIC SUBJECT THE SOVIETS BROUGHT UP OTHER THAN DATA, HAS CONTAINED STRONG IMPLICATION OF WILLINGNESS TO COMPROMISE ON THE COLLECTIVE CEILING. THE SOVIET ARGUMENT HAS BEEN THAT IT IS DISCRIMINATORY TO SINGLE OUT TWO SPECIFIC COUNTRIES FOR NATIONAL SUB-CEILINGS WHEN ALL THE OTHERS ARE GOING TO BE EMBRACED UNDER A COLLECTIVE CEILING.

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ACTION SS-25

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S E C R E T SECTION 5 OF 5 MBFR VIENNA 0040

EXDIS

DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS DEFENSE, USCINCEUR, USNMR SHAPE

FROM US REP MBFR

28. THE CONTINUED EASTERN ARGUMENT ABOUT THE NEED TO REALLOCATE POLISH AND CZECHOSLOVAK GROUND-BASED NATIONAL AIR DEFENSE PERSONNEL, REITERATED IN THE PRESENT CONVERSATION, AND GIVEN A PROMINENT PLACE IN THE EASTERN QUESTIONS ABOUT WESTERN DATA POSED IN THE INFORMAL SESSION OF FEB 8, IS NOT NECESSARILY

REQUIRED BY A PROGRAM OF EQUAL PERCENTAGE REDUCTION OF BOTH GROUND AND AIR FORCE MANPOWER. HOWEVER, THE REASON FOR THE PRESENT EMPHASIS MAY BE TO COUNTER WESTERN CRITICISMS OF EASTERN DATA BY CASTING DISCREDIT ON WESTERN DATA. NOR, AS WE POINTED OUT TO THE SOVIETS, IS THE PRESENT EASTERN POSITION THAT THE EAST HAD INCLUDED ALL PACT MILITARY PERSONNEL IN ITS DATA CONSISTENT WITH EARLIER EASTERN CLAIMS THAT WESTERN TOTAL FIGURES FOR NATO FORCES ARE TOO LOW AND THAT THE EAST SHOULD RECEIVE CREDIT FOR MILITARY PERSONNEL PERFORMING FUNCTIONS ALLEGEDLY PERFORMED BY CIVILIANS IN THE WEST.

29. OUR CONCLUSION CONTINUES TO BE THAT THE DISCREPANCY OF 180,000 MEN BETWEEN TABLED WARSAW PACT FIGURES AND CURRENT
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NATO ESTIMATES OF WARSAW PACT FORCES IS TOO LARGE TO BE THE RESULT OF WESTERN COUNTING ERROR AND THAT THE EAST HAS NOT COUNTED ALL OF ITS PERSONNEL IN THE AREA.

30. THE SITUATION WHICH APPEARS TO BE EMERGING IN THE DATA DISCUSSION WITH THE EAST WILL BE MORE DIFFICULT TO HANDLE FOR THE WEST THAN ONE IN WHICH THE EAST HAD FROM THE OUTSET EXPLICITLY ADMITTED USE OF DIFFERENT COUNTING RULES. THERE WILL BE ALL THE MORE NEED TO MAINTAIN A CALM AND BUSINESSLIKE ATMOSPHERE IN THE DISCUSSION, TO MAINTAIN PRESS CONFIDENTIALITY, AND TO AVOID ACCUSATIONS OF BAD FAITH WHICH COULD MAKE MORE DIFFICULT THE NECESSARY EFFORT TO OBTAIN INFORMATION FROM THE EAST. END COMMENT.

31. ON FEB 14, US REP FULLY BRIEFED MEMBERS OF THE AD HOC GROUP ON THE CONTENT OF THIS BILATERAL DISCUSSION. HE REQUESTED THAT THIS INFORMATION BE TREATED AS ESPECIALLY CONFIDENTIAL BOTH BECAUSE OF THE CONTENT AND IN ORDER NOT TO INHIBIT FURTHER EXCHANGES WITH SOVIET REPS. RESOR

NOTE BY OC/T: NOT PASSED ABOVE ADDRESSEES.

SECRET

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: Z
Capture Date: 01-Jan-1994 12:00:00 am
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: DIPLOMATIC DISCUSSIONS, MUTUAL FORCE REDUCTIONS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Sent Date: 14-Feb-1977 12:00:00 am
Decaption Date: 22 May 2009
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 22 May 2009
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1977MBFRV00040
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Expiration:
Film Number: D770052-0358
Format: TEL
From: MBFR VIENNA
Handling Restrictions:
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1977/newtext/t19770244/aaaabnhi.tel
Line Count: 588
Litigation Code IDs:
Litigation Codes:
Litigation History:
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Message ID: 645ecec6-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Office: ACTION SS
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 11
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Reference: n/a
Retention: 0
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 19-Nov-2004 12:00:00 am
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review Media Identifier:
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 3328946
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: MBFR: BILATERAL DISCUSSION WITH SOVIET REPS OF FEB 12, 1977 BEGIN SUMMARY: US REP AND US DEP REP MET WITH SOVIET REPS TARASOV AND SHUSTOV AT SOVIET INVITATION ON FEB 12
TAGS: PARM, UR, US, NATO
To: STATE
Type: TE
vdkgvkey: odbcr://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/645ecec6-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Review Markings:
Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
22 May 2009
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 22 May 2009